

Winter Term 2019/2020

University of Cologne, Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences

Cologne Center for Comparative Politics (CCCP)

Chair of International Comparative Political Economy and Economic Sociology

Doctoral & Master Course: Who Rules the Economy? The Political Economy of Labor and Business Power

ECTS: 9

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Office Hours: By appointment! Please write an email to: christine.trampusch@uni-koeln.de

Time: Wednesdays, 4.00-5.30pm (October 16, 2019 to December 18, 2019, weekly)

Compact Session on Thursday, January 16, 2020, 9.00am to 5.00pm

Room: Regular Sessions: Lecture Room 2, Gottfried-Keller-Str. 6

Compact Session: IBW-Building (Seminar Room 3.40)

Course Description: Who rules the economy? Comparative political economy comprises the analysis of the power relationship between labor and capital. But what is economic power? Do both have the same amount of political power? How can labor and business power (resources) be measured? How do labor and business influence public policies at the national and international level? How are labor and business power affected by mega trends such as economic globalization, de-industrialization and digitalization? On the basis of conceptual papers and empirical studies, this course discusses theories and concepts for the comparative analysis of labor and business power. As the seminar's overarching goal is to enable participants to write their own research papers on labor or business influence based on the concepts introduced and discussed in class, regular attendance is of utmost importance for the quality of term papers. All texts are available on the ILIAS-website of the course.

Requirements and evidence of academic achievement:

Participants are expected to hand in a two-page outline of their planned term papers **before January 2, 2020** and **present this outline in class on January 16, 2020**.

Final grading is based on individual in-class presentations on papers discussed in class (see syllabus "presentation") and an empirical term paper, in which the participant answers a research question of his or her choice (handed in on **March 1, 2020** (late assignments will be penalized, unless prior arrangements are made!)).

Please register for this course via KLIPS 2. After the first class (October 16, 2019) no further enrolments will be accepted.

Students are expected to: attend sessions regularly, actively contribute to class discussions, complete assigned readings according to schedule: "compulsory reading" – all students read; "presentation" – only reading by the respective presenter; write a term paper of not more than 10,000 words, own research on literature/data/material is required. All papers will be checked for plagiarism. Please read for further information about plagiarism: www.cccp.uni-koeln.de. We use the software "turnitin" to check for plagiarism: <http://www.wiso-it.uni-koeln.de/turnitin.html>. Term papers have to be written in English language. Since nearly all reading assignments are in English, this will be the general classroom language as well. Participants therefore must know enough English to be able to participate actively. Perfection is not required – you just need to understand and make yourself understood.

Date	Topic
16.10	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Introduction & Basics</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pierson, P. (2016): Power in Historical Institutionalism. In: Fioretos, O., Falleti, T.G., Sheingate, A. (eds): <i>The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism</i>, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 124-141. • Bachrach, P., Baratz, M.S. (1963). Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework. <i>The American Political Science Review</i>, 57(3), 632-42. • Weber, M. (1978): Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology. 16. Power and Domination. In: Roth, G., & Wittich, C. (eds): <i>Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology</i>. Berkeley: University of California Press. 53-54.
23.10	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Labor Power</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Korpi, W. (1983): <i>The Democratic Class Struggle</i>. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1-6, 7-25, 184-207. <p>Presentation_1_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Huber, E., Huo, J., Stephens, J.D. (2017): Power, Policy, and Top Income Shares. <i>Socio-Economic Review</i>. Online First. <p>Presentation_2_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wong, M.Y. (2017). Median Voter and Power Resources Revisited: A Composite Model of Inequality. <i>European Political Science Review</i>, 9(4), 607-628.
30.10	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Business Power</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culpepper, P.D. (2010): <i>Quiet politics and business power: Corporate control in Europe and Japan</i>. Cambridge University Press. 177-98. • Culpepper, P.D. (2015): Structural Power and Political Science in the Post-Crisis Era. <i>Business and Politics</i>, 17(3), 391-409. <p>Presentation_3_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culpepper, P.D., Reinke, R. (2014): Structural Power and Bank Bailouts in the United Kingdom and the United States. <i>Politics & Society</i>, 42(4), 427-454. <p>Presentation_4_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Young, K. (2015): Not by Structure Alone: Power, Prominence, and Agency in American Finance. <i>Business and Politics</i>, 17(3), 443-472.
06.11	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Power & International Political Economy</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Barnett, M., Duvall, R. (2005): Power in International Politics. <i>International Organization</i>, 59(1), 39-75. <p>Presentation_5_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Casier, T. (2018): The Different Faces of Power in European Union–Russia Relations. <i>Cooperation and Conflict</i>, 53(1), 101-117. <p>Presentation_6_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kim, In Song (2017): Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 111(1): 1-20.

13.11	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Business Power & The State</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mann, M. (1984): The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results. <i>European Journal of Sociology</i>, 25(2), 185-213. <p>Presentation_7_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Braun, B. (2018): Central Banking and the Infrastructural Power of Finance: The Case of ECB Support for Repo and Securitization Markets. <i>Socio-Economic Review</i>, Online First. <p>Presentation_8_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weiss, L., Thurbon, E. (2018). Power Paradox: How the Extension of US Infrastructural Power Abroad Diminishes State Capacity at Home. <i>Review of International Political Economy</i>, 25(6), 779-810.
20.11	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Lobbying & EU Policy Making</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dür, A. (2008). Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU: A Note on Methodology. <i>European Union Politics</i>, 9(4), 559-576. <p>Presentation_9_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Buena, A., Ibenskas, R. (2015): Quantitative Text Analysis and the Study of EU Lobbying and Interest Groups. <i>European Union Politics</i>, 16(3), 429–455. & Klüver, H. (2015): The Promises of Quantitative Text Analysis in Interest Group Research: A Reply to Bunea and Ibenskas. <i>European Union Politics</i>, 16(3), 456–466. <p>Presentation_10_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> De Bruycker, I., & Beyers, J. (2019): Lobbying Strategies and Success: Inside and Outside Lobbying in European Union Legislative Politics. <i>European Political Science Review</i>, 11(1), 57-74.
27.11	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Power & Finance</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Young, K.L., Marple, T., Heilman, J. (2017): Beyond the Revolving Door: Advocacy Behavior and Social Distance to Financial Regulators. <i>Business and Politics</i>, 19(2), 327-364. <p>Presentation_11_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trampusch, C. & Fastenrath, F. (2019): States' Interests as Limits to the Power of Finance: Regulatory Reforms in Early Local Government. <i>Regulation & Governance</i>. Forthcoming. <p>Presentation_12_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bell, S., Hindmoor, A. (2016): Structural Power and the Politics of Bank Capital Regulation in the United Kingdom. <i>Political Studies</i>, 65(1), 103-121.
04.12	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Power & Financialization</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wittko, C. (2014): The Politics of Financialization in the United States, 1949-2005. <i>British Journal of Political Science</i> 46: 349-370. <p>Presentation_13_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Meyer, B. (2017). Financialization, Technological Change, and Trade Union Decline. <i>Socio-Economic Review</i>. Online first. <p>Presentation_14_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mertens, A., Trampusch, C., Fastenrath, F., Wangemann, R. (2019): The Political Economy of Local Government Financialization and the Role of Policy Diffusion. <i>Regulation & Governance</i>. Forthcoming.

11.12	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Power & Digital Economy I</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culpepper, P.D., Thelen, K. (2019): Are We All Amazon Primed? Consumers and the Politics of Platform Power." <i>Comparative Political Studies</i>; Online First. <p>Presentation_15_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thelen, K. (2018): Regulating Uber: The Politics of the Platform Economy in Europe and the United States. <i>Perspectives on Politics</i>, 16(4), 938-953. <p>Presentation_16_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kalyanpur, N., Newman, A.L. (2019): The MNC-Coalition Paradox: Issue Salience, Foreign Firms and the General Data Protection Regulation. <i>Journal of Common Market Studies</i> 57(3), 448-467.
18.12	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Power & Digital Economy II</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rahman, K.S, Thelen, K. (2019): The Rise of the Platform Business Model and the Transformation of Twenty-First-Century Capitalism. <i>Politics & Society</i>; Online First. <p>Presentation_17_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hope, D., & Martelli, A. (2019). The Transition to the Knowledge Economy, Labor Market Institutions, and Income Inequality in Advanced Democracies. <i>World Politics</i>, 71(2), 236-288. <p>Presentation_18_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meyer, B., Biegert, T. (2019). The Conditional Effect of Technological Change on Collective Bargaining Coverage. <i>Research & Politics</i>; Online First.
16.01	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Compact Day (January 16, 2020, 9.00am to 5.00pm)</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) <u>In-class application of the concepts – Cases will be selected out of 2018 media reports on domestic and international politics</u> 2) <u>Presentation of Students’ Two pages outline of their paper (Earn your bonus)</u>