

14335.0111: Distributive Politics

Wednesdays, 16:00-17:30
9 ECTS points

[106 Seminargebäude](#)
Universitätsstraße 35
50931 Köln

Room: S13

Compact course: **10.06.2017** WiSo Modulbau Seminarraum 3

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Outline of the Course

Distributive politics characterize income redistribution and the allocation of public goods and services (e. g. health care, education, social security, but also particularistic goods) to individuals or groups and are based on taxes and transfers. Wealth and resources are unequally distributed in society. The question that distributive politics consequently address asks: who gets what, who benefits – who loses? Distributive politics illustrate the very heart of politics and a vibrant field of research which just gained new momentum in the last years. We will study principles of resource allocation from political actors (parties) to individuals (voters), considering the electoral payoff for political parties and voters. Which groups are targeted by political parties with public goods provision: core or swing voters, the rich or the poor, the median voter or particular groups (clients), the winning coalition or the electorate? Do voters respond to non-programmatic inducements such as vote buying? When does income inequality lead to upheaval and regime change? We will start with the discussion of classical concepts and theories in comparative political economy before we move towards the analysis of current issues in this field of research in the course of the seminar.

Distributive politics refer to two central aspects in the political sphere: 1) political accountability and 2) political responsiveness. The first aspect studies how far voters are able to hold political actors accountable for their actions and, thus, takes into account the political consequences of distributive politics (e. g. political survival, distributive conflict). The latter considers the redistributive effect of distributive politics. Do these policies reflect the demand of the voters (mostly, the median voter) or rather particular groups, and do they maximize welfare? We will start with the clarification of classical concepts, such as *core* and *swing* voters, and theories of distributive politics **(I)**. In **section II** we study income inequality and distributive conflicts that emerge from unequal distribution of wealth, finding out which incentives are at work at the individual level to either push for or against redistribution. We investigate micro theories on redistribution in democratic and non-democratic countries and tease out the important role of

regime type. In **section III** we move on to distributive politics that are based on favoritism (political clientelism) and voter intimidation. Here, we study the effects of vote buying on political accountability and political participation with a particular focus on the case of Argentina and we investigate the redistributive effects of clientelistic resource allocation regarding electoral outcomes for the incumbent and the quality of democracy in general. Finally, we will delve into the new research field on voter intimidation (through violence and coercion) as an electoral strategy to influence voting behavior looking at field experiments for the case of Nigeria and the politician's incentive for the case of electoral intimidation in Imperial Germany.

The goal of the seminar is to establish a genuine understanding for the most crucial question in comparative politics: how public goods are distributed in society. The seminar provides participants with a broad set of classical political economy theories (with a strong emphasis on micro theories), examples from the research frontier on distributive politics and a range of research designs and methodological approaches to draw upon for own research in the field of comparative politics and political economy.

Prerequisites

A good knowledge of general political science concepts, theories and basic quantitative and qualitative methods is required. Students should be able to understand and articulate themselves in English as this will be the general classroom language. Of course, perfection is not required but you should be able to make yourself understood. The term paper should be written in English as well.

Requirements

The sessions in class are designed as a very participatory seminar format. This means that the class also depends on your in-class participation. Each participant will prepare a **10 to 15 minutes presentation** based on additional material or own research on one of the seminar topics. In order to ensure the quality of participation I expect you to have prepared the required readings prior to class and to attend all meetings. The required reading is indicated as such, but you will also find *recommended* readings which are not required for class. The recommended readings list only serves as orientation in case that you intend to delve deeper into the particular research topic. A **reader with the required texts** for the sessions of the seminar can be bought at Copy Star (Zülpicher Straße 184, 50937 Cologne) at the beginning of April.

The **term paper** should bear on the themes discussed in class and contain no more than 6.000 words (approximately 15-20 pages). You should be clear about your theory, data and methodological approach. It is vital to develop a clear research design that supports your analytical interest. The paper is due on **August 30th 2017** (24:00). Please submit your paper electronically as a PDF document to sarah.berens@uni-koeln.de. Late papers will be punished. The final grade is composed of the term paper, in-class participation and the individual presentation.

In addition to the electronic paper version (which will be checked for plagiarism), please submit a paper version in the course of the week of the due date at the secretary of the [CCCP](#) (please check our homepage for opening hours). The paper version must contain the following signed statement:

http://www.cccp.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/cccp/Lehre/ErklaerungzuArbeiten.pdf

Registration

Please register via KLIPS. If you cannot use KLIPS, please register by sending me an email (sarah.berens@uni-koeln.de).

Basic Reading Recommendations (optional)

- Przeworski, A., Stokes, S. and Manin, B. (1999) *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2005) *The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson, S. I. (2007) *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

I FUNDAMENTALS

19.04.2017

1. Introduction

- Golden, M. and Min, (2013) Distributive Politics Around the World. *American Review of Political Science*, 16: 73-99.

No class: 26.04.2017 and 03.05.2017

10.05.2017

2. Accountability and Representation

- Przeworski, A., Stokes, S. and Manin, B. (1999) *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*. Cambridge University Press: Introduction (p.1-27)
- Fearon (1999) Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance, p. 55-98 in: *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*. Cambridge University Press.

17.05.2017

3. Core versus Swing Voters

- Cox, G., McDubbins, (1986) Electoral Politics as Redistributive Game. *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 48: 370-389.
- Dixit, A. and Londregan, J. (1996) "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics" *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 58: 1132-55.

24.05.2017

4. Pork-barrel Politics in the United States

- Levitt, S. D. and Snyder, J. (1997) The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes. *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 105, No. 1: 30-53.
- Wilson, R. K. (1986) An Empirical Test of Preferences for the Political Pork Barrel: District Level Appropriations for River and Harbor Legislation, 1889-1913. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 30, No. 4: 729-754.

Recommended:

- Shepsle, K. A. and Weingast, B. R. (1981) Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 25, No. 1: 96-111.

II INCOME INEQUALITY AND DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICTS

31.05.2017

5. Distributive Politics and Regime Type

Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J.D., Siverson, R. M, and Smith, A. (2001). Political Competition and Economic Growth. *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 12. No 1, 58-72.

Lake and Baum (2001) The invisible hand of democracy. *Comparative Political Studies* 34: 587-621.

Recommended:

Sokoloff, K. L. and S. L. Engerman (2000) History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vo. 14, No. 3: 217-232.

William Easterly. (2007) “Inequality Does Cause Underdevelopment” *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 84: 755-776.

Whit Sunday Break: no class on June 7th

10.06.2017 (Saturday – compact course! 10:00-17:30)

6. Income Inequality and Distributive Conflict

Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2005) *The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chp. 1- 2 + Chp. 4 (approximately 70 pages)

10.06.2017 (Saturday – compact course! 10:00-17:30)

7. Preferences for Redistribution

Dixit, A. and J. Londregan (1998) Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 497-529.

Dion and Birchfield (2012) Economic Development, Income Inequality, and Preferences for Redistribution. *International Studies Quarterly* 54: 315-334.

Recommended:

Milanovic (2000) The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution: an empirical test with the required data. *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 16: 367-410.

10.06.2017 (Saturday – compact course! 10:00-17:30)

8. Ethnicity and Distributive Politics

Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N., and Weinstein, J. M. (2007) Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 101, No. 4: 709-725.

Kasara, K. (2007) Tax me if you can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 101, No. 1: 159-172.

Recommended:

Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. M. (2009) Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development. [American Review of Political Science](#).

Baldwin, K. and J. D. Huber (2010) Economic versus Cultural Differences: Forms of Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104.

III. DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS, CLIENTELISM AND COERCION

10.06.2017 (Saturday – compact course! 10:00-17:30)

9. Clientelism, Democracy and Concept Clarification

Hilgers, T. (2012) Democratic Processes, Clientelistic Relationships and the Material Goods Problem. Pp- 1-22 in: T. Hilgers ed. *Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Schaffer (2007) *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press. Chp. 1+2. (30 pages)

Recommended:

Stokes, S. (2007) Political Clientelism, in: C. Boix and S. Stokes (eds.) *Handbook of Comparative Politics* Oxford University Press.

Hopkin (2006) Conceptualizing Political Clientelism: Political Exchange and Democratic Theory. Unpublished Manuscript, 1-19.

14.06.2017

10. Vote-buying and Distributive Politics

Stokes, S. C. (2005) Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. *American Political Science Review* 99 (3), 315-25.

Nichter, S. (2008) Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 102: 19-31.

Recommended:

Jensen, P. and M. Justensen (2014) Poverty and vote buying: Survey-based evidence from Africa. *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 33: 220-232.

No class on 21.06.2017

28.06.2017

11. Party Competition and Distributive Politics

Kitschelt (2000) Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities. *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 6/7, 845-879.

Ernesto Calvo and Maria Victoria Murillo, “Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market,” *American Journal of Political Science* ,48 (Oct. 2004): 742-57.

05.07.2017

12. Clientelism, Social Policy and Voting Behavior

De la O, A. (2013) Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 57: 1-14.

Nichter, S. (2014) Political Clientelism and Social Policy in Brazil. Pp. 130-151 in: D.A. Brun and L. Diamond (eds.) *Clientelism, Social Policy and the Quality of Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Recommended:

Wantchekon, L. (2003) Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin. *World Politics*, Vol. 55, 399-422.

12.07.2017

13. Voter Intimidation: Changing Vote Choice through Coercion?

Mares, I. and Zhu, B. (2015) The Production of electoral intimidation: economic and political incentives, *The Journal of Comparative Politics*. 2015. 48(1), 23- 41.

Collier, P. and Vicente, C. (2014) Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria. *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 124, 327-355.

Bratton, M (2008) Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns. *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 27, 621-632.

Recommended:

Mares, I. and Young, L. (2016) Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes. *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 19:267–88.

19.07.2017

14. Final Discussion and Paper Presentation

Auyero, J. (1999) “From the client’s point(s) of view”: How poor people perceive and evaluate political clientelism. *Theory and Society*, Vol. 28: 297-334.